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INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION: AN EFFICIENT OR INEFFICIENT
PHENOMENON?

by
Mitchell B. Weiss*
1. INTRODUCTION

"Taxes are what we pay for civilized society."' Unquestionably this
is true, but in today's technologically driven, globally interwoven world,
how much we pay is increasingly being decided by how much the taxes
are worth. Not always has this been the case. Taxpayers have always been
free to "vote with their feet," so to speak, if the taxes they paid were not
worth the mix of services they received. But legal and financial barriers
often combined to make this option illusory. Indeed, not too long ago,
the U.S. Treasury enjoyed a largely captive tax base: taxpayers lived,
worked, and invested in the U.S.; cross-border transactions were scarce, information costly; and even if the taxpayer chose to operate abroad, the
taxman still managed to collect his cut, nonetheless. Today, the story is
quite different.
The explosive growth in telecommunications technology is fundamentally altering the U.S. tax system in two important and complementary
ways. First, because the U.S. tax system is based on the physical - not the
virtual - world, it is no longer in sync with the world's emerging electronic economy. Second, this technology boom is fueling an already extant international tax race, a race a growing number of economists are
will result in the collapse of the income tax system as we know
predicting
it.2 Although similar apocalyptic predictions regarding the Y2K bug proved

Associate, Sidley & Austin. This article has benefitted greatly from the comments of a number of individuals. I would like to thank in particular: Suresh
Advani, Brian Horan, Kevin Pryor, Sharp Sorensen, David Weiss, Janice Weiss,
and Jay Zimbler.
I Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue,
275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
*

See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1586 (2000) [hereinafter, "Globalization"]
(quoting Richard Bird's prediction that "[i]f something is not done to rectify
these problems soon, the future of the income tax is bleak"); Thomas F. Field,
If the Corporate Tax Has No Future, Is Tax Competition a Threat?, 2000 WTD 42-1
March 1, 2000 (reporting that the Canadian Tax Foundation recently bet on
2

"the date on which the last OECD member country will abolish the corporate
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utterly ridiculous, and although there is currently no empirical evidence
that conclusively supports this prediction, the inference that globalization
will at least have a profound affect on the U.S. income tax system is practically unavoidable.
This Article examines the legal and economic implications of this
globalization phenomenon. Part I discusses the allocative effect an income
tax system has on a particular country's resources. This first part, while focusing only on domestic tax policy, is intended to throw some light on the
international issues that are the central focus of this article. So with this
background in mind, Part II turns to the international scene, analyzing
the efficiency effect international integration is having on the world's income tax systems in general and the U.S.'s income tax system in particular. Finally, Part III considers what the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has proposed be done about this
"harmful" phenomenon and whether anything can or should be done
about it.
II. THE (IN)EFFICIENT INCOME TAx SYSTEM
A. The U.S. Income Tax System Corrects Market Deficiencies

The U.S. income tax system both corrects and exacerbates market
deficiencies. The good news, always first: since taxes modify behavior, the
income tax system can be (and frequently is) used to correct perceived
market deficiencies. 3 Mobilizing the income tax system in this way, how-

income tax"; the earliest "bet" was ten years); Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies, 47 J. FIN. 1159 (1992); VITO TANZI, TAXATION
IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 65-67 (1995)

[hereinafter, "TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD"] (citing others).
3 For example in 1981, Congress estimated that the personal savings rate, when

compared to the personal disposable income, had declined from 8.6 percent in
1976 to 5.6 percent in 1980. See General Explanation of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (1981). So to encourage greater personal savings, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 increased the deductible amount
an individual could contribute to an individual retirement account, even if the
individual was already covered by an employee-sponsored plan. In enacting this
tax incentive, however, Congress failed to appreciate the actual inducement this
provision would have; rather than creating a savings incentive it actually created
a savings disincentive. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 105 (4th ed.
1983) (estimating that this savings incentive created a $3 billion.loss in revenue
"because it provides a tax benefit even if the individual switches assets from another account to an IRA or borrows the money for the IRA investment.")
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ever, is only socially desirable if the targeted activity produces an uncompensated benefit or harm on society.
Indeed, in a perfectly competitive market, uncompensated externalities would never exist, and so a market correction would never be necessary. Society would compensate the investor, and the investor would
compensate society, for whatever positive and/or negative externalities a
particular activity respectively created, but only up to slightly less than the
amount the total net benefits from the particular activity exceeded the total net benefits available under the next best investment alternative. 4 But
since the market is not (yet?) p&fectly competitive, and thus transaction
costs often inhibit this self-correcting mechanism, the tax system, or other
legal rules, often act as a market surrogate, mimicking what the market
would do were it perfectly competitive.
The analysis necessarily begins with the rational taxpayer. From his
perspective, the more an activity benefits (harms) society, relative to available alternative activities, the less (more) desirable the activity will appear.
So at some point, this externality will skew the taxpayer's incentives, thus
creating an inefficient result. This is because the substituted activity will
produce a smaller net gain, though a larger personal gain, than the activity the taxpayer would have otherwise chosen. Otherwise, the taxpayer
would have initially opted for the substituted activity, and thus maximized
society's (and his) wealth, without the need for legal intervention.
Example 1. Assume a rational taxpayer must choose between two investment alternatives, X and Y X produces a total net gain of $100, and Y
$50. If there is a sufficiently large net uncompensated externality, the taxpayer may very well invest in Y, even though X is the socially desirable result. For example, the taxpayer would not invest in X if he could capture
all of Y's net benefits (i.e., the full $50) but less than $50 of X's net benefits. Or even if the taxpayer could capture all of X's net benefits (i.e., the
full $100), he would still invest in Y if more than $50 of Ys costs were imposed (without reimbursement from the taxpayer) on society.
No matter how the distortion materializes, Congress can neutralize
it, and thereby align the taxpayers' incentives with the most efficient outcomes, by (i) taxing those activities that produce negative externalities,
(ii) providing tax breaks for those activities that produce positive externalities, or (iii) taxing some and giving incentives for others. Regardless of
how this is accomplished, the effect (though probably not the magnitude
of the effect) will be the same: the tax dis/incentive will create a substitu-

See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960), reprinted in
RH. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAw 95, 97-104 (1988).
4
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tion effect. A tax reduction (or refundable credit) will attract more resources to the subsidized activity than would otherwise be the case; and a
tax increase will have the opposite effect.
Of course reality is a good deal more complicated than this example suggests. Both X and Y will probably produce uncompensated positive
and negative externalities, which is why "the proper procedure is to compare the total social product yielded by these different arrangements."' Yet
it may be difficult, or it may not be cost justified, to make such comparisons, especially when these varying externalities fluctuate over time and
among taxpayers. Moreover, and even more troubling, is the unfortunate
fact that these inefficiencies are often a byproduct or end-result of other
offsetting or complementing inefficiencies.
B. The U.S. Income Tax System Creates Market Inefficiencies

Now the worse news: most scholars believe the U.S. income tax system distorts behavior and is thus, itself, economically inefficient. 6 How
inefficient, though, is anyone's guess.
Thankfully, not all increases in utility are taxable. A taxpayer may
garner just as much if not more pleasure from basking in the sun than
from spending a day's hard earned pay. But only the paycheck is taxable.
Likewise, a taxpayer may enjoy spending a dollar today just as much as he
enjoys spending whatever that dollar is worth tomorrow, if invested at an
appropriate rate. But only the income earned on the dollar is taxable,
even if the dollar plus the amount it earned is worth less tomorrow than
what a single dollar is worth today.
Since an income tax is not imposed on the utility one receives
from leisure or consumption, but is imposed on the income earned from
saving or working, an income tax may create a substitution effect: The tax-

5
6

Id. at 142.
See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51

L. REv. 1653, 1655 (1998) ("[T]he animating feature of both lawyers' and
economists' analyses of tax schemes is their potential to distort people's work inVAND.

centives."); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994)

("[T] he income tax distorts work incentives."); Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAx L. Rv. 283, 284 (1990) ("Not only does income taxation
distort individual actions to the point that their sum no longer occupies an efficient frontier, but the political process through which we allocate tax costs permits groups to indulge the hope (or the illusion) that they will be able to deflect the costs from themselves to others.").
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payer may work less and consume more - a potentially undesirable, inefficient result. The magnitude of this substitution effect, however, depends
on at least two factors: the level of the tax rate; and the elasticity of the
taxpayer's demand for work or saving.7 Therefore, it is generally acknowledged that allocative efficiency necessitates a tax rate that inversely tracks
the elasticity of the taxed activity.8 So a head tax is perfectly efficient because the tax base - i.e., one's head - is perfectly inelastic; that is, the
tax cannot distort the taxpayer's behavior because he will owe the tax no
matter what he does.
While seemingly self-evident, whether an income tax is inefficient
is in fact far from clear. Indeed, because of a number of offsetting factors,
the empirical evidence on this point is inconclusive.9 One such factor is
the so-called "income effect" a tax may have on the taxpayer's conduct.
Rather than focusing on the demand for a particular activity, this theory
focuses on the extent to which the supply of a particular activity is responsive to a change in the tax rate. The substitution effect simply assumes
that the taxpayer's supply of the taxed activity (i.e., saving or working) is
more elastic than his demand for achieving a given after-tax result. In
other words, the substitution effect assumes that the taxpayer's supply of,
say, capital is more dependent on the amount of pre-tax income that is
taxed than on the amount of after-tax income that is received. But the opposite may be true. If the taxpayer desperately needs or wants a fixed.
amount of disposable income, increasing the tax rate may not dissuade
him from achieving his goal, but may merely make that goal more difficult to achieve. 10 Thus, so long as the utility the taxpayer receives from
achieving a particular goal (i.e., saving for a vacation) is not less than the
disutility he has to endure (i.e., working or saving more) in accomplishing
that goal, a tax increase may actually provide an incentive to work or save
more!

8

See
See

TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD, supra note 2, at
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 523-24

65-67.
(5th ed. 1998) [here-

inafter, "EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW"].
9 See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAx POLICY

77 (5th ed. 1987) [hereinafter,

"FEDERAL TAx PoLiCy"].
10 See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,

87 HARv. L. REv. 1113, 1173 (1974) ("For one who is saving to meet some particular objective, exemption of savings from the personal income tax would make
it easier to meet that goal and would therefore operate to let the individual
spend a higher portion of his current income."); FEDERAL TAx Poicy, supra note
9, at 76-78.
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THE (IN) EFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL TAx SYSTEM

This exception to the substitution effect, however, is subject to a
further, more significant, exception. An income tax may or may not push

the taxpayer into a different activity. It depends on whether the income
effect prevails over the substitution effect, and the substitution effect depends on how much tax is imposed and how elastic or inelastic the activity is. While the substitution effect has been around at least as long as
there has been an income tax, it has recently adapted to our interconnected world economy.
Taxing an activity today may not only create an incentive to substitute to a different activity; it may also create an incentive to engage in the
same activity in another jurisdiction. Of course, cross-border opportunities
have always been available, but political and technological barriers to the
movement of goods, services, and capital have, in the past, greatly inhibited their feasibility. That is, even if the taxpayer could earn a higher after-tax return in another jurisdiction, transaction costs often eliminated
this inter-jurisdictional earnings differential.
A. International Tax Competition

The picture is vastly different today. Advances in telecommunications technology, coupled with the deregulation of the financial and capital markets, have not only mitigated this concern. They have also redefined the competitive market, promising far greater efficiency than
heretofore ever imagined possible. In a perfect market, there would be no
entry or exit barriers; all buyers and sellers would simultaneously and instantaneously exchange all relevant information (price, delivery, quality,
warranties, etc.); transactions would be consummated in accordance with
the best matches; and there would be no transaction costs to boot. However far-fetched this theoretical market may seem, the Internet is rapidly
moving the world in this direction - towards a single, perfectly competitive market."
Indeed, it is now just as easy to enter into a cross border transaction as it is a local one. They are both after all just a mouse click away.
The Treasury is well aware of this: "Electronic commerce . . .may be con-

ducted without regard to national boundaries and may dissolve the link
between an income-producing activity and a specific location."' 2 Globaliza-

See Internet Economics: A Thinkers' Guide, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 2000, at 65.
12 Office

of Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Selected Tax Policy Implications
of Global Electronic Commerce § 7.2.3.1, at 20 (visited April, 1, 2000) <http://
www.fedworld.gov/pub/tel/internet.txt>.
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don has also mobilized much of the world's capital. To be sure, the numbers are staggering. It has been estimated that the total daily global capital
flows have increased from $15 billion in 1973 to $1.2 trillion in 1995.13
And this, in turn, is having a profound affect on the world's tax bases. It
has increased the elasticity of the income tax base and, with it, the migration of labor and, in particular, capital.1 4 Simply put, what was once inelastic is now elastic.
Today's international tax race appears to have started in the U.S.
In 1981, the Reagan Administration adopted a new, extravagant approach
to promoting economic growth and efficiency. Called supply side economics, the popular version of this approach was a politician's dream, though
only in one's dreams could all of its goals be achieved. It promised deep
tax cuts and an increase in tax revenues. Steep progressivity, the proponents argued, creates crushing work disincentives. So much so, that if the
marginal tax rates are reduced, significantly, the revenues gained from the
increase in output will more than offset the revenues that are lost from
the concomitant tax rate reductions. 5 Needless to say, Congress cut taxes
- significantly.16 Although these tax cuts did increase productivity, on the
whole they failed to deliver, 7 thus creating a massive budgetary deficit
that could only be financed from abroad. 18
So in 1984, Congress set out to do just that. It abolished the 30
percent withholding tax that, absent an overriding treaty provision, had

13

See Peter D. Sutherland, Sharing the Bounty: Challenges of Globalization, BANKER,

Nov. 1998, at 16.
4 The U.S. imposes an expatriation tax on U.S. citizens and certain long-term
resident aliens who renounce their citizenship for the principal purpose of
avoiding U.S. tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 877. This so-called exit or ex-patriot tax was
amended in 1995, at which time Congress estimated that approximately $3.6 billion would be lost over the following decade as a result of a number of wealthy
individuals renouncing their citizenship. See Renee S. Liu, The Expatriate Exclusion Clause: An Inappropriateresponse to Relinquishing Citizenship for Tax Avoidance
Purposes, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 689, 693 (1998) (Comment); Robert Lenzner &
Philippe Mao, The New Refugees, FORBES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 131.
15 See VED P. GANDHI, SUPPLY-SIDE TAX POLICY: ITS RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 8-11 (1987); FEDERAL TAX POLICY, supra note 9, at 74.

The maximum individual rate was cut from 70 percent in 1980 to 50 percent
in 1982; the IRA deduction was extended to employed and self-employed persons; and aggressive depreciation deductions and investment tax credits were
provided. See FEDERAL TAx POLICY, supra note 9, at 122, 160, 301.
16

1 See id. at 74.
18 See Globalization, supra note 2, at 1580.
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been imposed on nonresident alien's portfolio interest income; it indirectly eliminated, as a practical matter, the 30 percent withholding tax on
capital gains that previously applied to certain nonresident aliens who

were present in the U.S.; '9 and it even facilitated the foreign borrowers'
tax evasion.20 While dividends paid to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations are still statutorily subject to this 30 percent withholding tax,
rapid advances in derivatives-based technology have made this tax largely

19 Although foreign persons are generally not subject to U.S. tax on their U.S.-

source capital gains, there are two exceptions to this result, one real the other
illusory. If a foreign person owns more than five percent of any class stock that
is regularly traded on an established securities market, the gain from the sale of
such stock is subject to U.S. tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 897(c) (3). Section 871 (a) (2) imposes a 30 percent withholding tax on the U.S. source, net capital gains recognized by any nonresident alien individual who is present in the U.S. during any
taxable year for at least 183 days. However, since the enactment of Section
7701(b) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, this tax has been largely, if not
entirely, a dead letter. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b) (3) (stating that, "for purposes of
this title," an alien individual is "treated as a resident of the United States" if
the sum of the weighted number of days the individual was present in the U.S.
during the current and preceding two years equals or exceeds 183 days); see also
26 U.S.C. § 865(g) (expanding this definition to include nonresident aliens who
have a tax home in the U.S.).
20 See 26 U.S.C. § 871(h) (2) (A) (1994) (defining "portfolio interest" to include
certain obligations that are "not in registered form") (emphasis added). See also
26 U.S.C. §§ 871, 881 (1994); 2 JOEL D. KUNTZ & RoBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAl. TAXATION C1-17-19,
C1.03[2] [c] (1996). As a general matter, a debtor
cannot deduct its interest payments unless the "obligation is in registered
form." 26 U.S.C. § 163(f)(1) (1994). Of course, without this requirement, the
Internal Revenue Service would have no way of knowing whether the creditor
reported the interest it received. By carving out an exception for foreign creditors, Congress effectively facilitated foreign and U.S. (to the extent foreign entities purchase U.S. debt securities on behalf of U.S. borrowers) tax evasion. But
Congress had practically no choice in the matter, for if it prohibited the issuance of all bearer bonds, foreign investors could still achieve anonymity from
their home country's tax authorities by simply channeling the proceeds through
another country (such as the Cayman Islands) that does not have an information-sharing agreement with their home country. Interposing these investment
intermediaries, however, costs money, and thus reduces the effective yield on
the U.S. investment. At bottom, Congress had to facilitate the foreign investor's
tax evasion, lest it would have limited its ability to compete with those capitalimporting countries that permitted anonymous investing.
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elective." The cumulative effect of these provisions is clear: when it comes
to foreign portfolio investment, the U.S. is undoubtedly one of the world's
most lucrative tax havens.
The empirical evidence is in accord. In 1983, just one year before
Congress abolished its interest income and capital gains withholding tax,
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, a sub-unit of the Commerce Department, reported a paltry $17.8 billion in net foreign purchases of U.S. private and public securities. The next year, this figure jumped 226 percent
to $40.3 billion.2 2 And while this trend tapered off after 1988, during the

21

Indeed, derivatives technology has made it possible to "separate the cash flow

characteristics of a fungible asset, such as a publicly-traded security or commodity, from the collateral legal rights that attach to that asset." Suzanne F. Greenberg, Asset-Based Swaps: Challenges to Traditional Ownership Principles, 845 PLI/CoRP
413, 417 (May 1994). Thus, by entering into an equity swap with the U.S. corporation, the foreign taxpayer can essentially enjoy the economic equivalent of receiving a U.S. dividend without paying the withholding tax. See Treas. Reg. §
1.863-7(b) (2000) (providing that swap payments to foreigners are not treated as
U.S. source income); Kevin M. Keyes Notional Principal Contracts, 484 PLI/TAx
799, 866 (Oct-Nov. 2000) (" IT]he better view under the current regulations is
that equity swaps .

.

. do not trigger tax and withholding under Sections 897

and 1445.").
22 See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1-U.S. International Transactions (visited April 15, 2000) <http//www.bea.doc.gov/bea/
di/bopa>. [hereinafter "Department of Commerce"]. This dramatic rise in foreign portfolio investments may reflect not the elimination of the 30 percent
withholding tax, but rather the elimination of the costs that were previously necessary to circumvent it. Before 1984, U.S. debtors frequently avoided this tax by
washing their loan proceeds through a Netherlands-Antilles finance subsidiary.
But this maneuver was not only costly to setup, see THOMAS P. AzzARA, TAX
HAVENS OF THE WORLD 9 (5th ed. 1995) [hereinafter "TAX HAVENS OF THE
WORLD"] ("Throughout the 1970's and for most of the 1980's the costs to register an offshore holding company in most any of the world's tax havens were
continually on the rise."), but - because of the IRS's insistence on substance
over form - was also costly to operate. By requiring that the NetherlandAntilles conduit retain no more than a five-to-one debt to equity ratio, the Treasury essentially charged the debtor a premium for avoiding the withholding tax
in this way. See Rev. Rul. 69-501, 1969-2 C.B. 233, revoked by Rev. Rul. 74-464, 19742 C.B. 46. The foreign creditor's return was reduced, and so the U.S. debtor's
interest charge was increased, by the tax the Netherland-Antilles government assessed on the income the conduit earned on the minimum capital the Treasury
required. Thus, the elimination of the portfolio interest withholding tax eliminated the need to incur this deadweight loss, and thereby precipitated the sharp
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second half of the 1990s, when the Internet was suddenly everywhere,"
the U.S. experienced a remarkable resurgence in foreign portfolio and direct investment. Since 1995, net foreign portfolio purchases have increased over 333 percent, from $91.2 billion to $304.1 billion; and over
this same time period, foreign direct investment has registered spectacular
gains, increasing over 680 percent, from $41.4 billion in 1995 to $282.5
billion in 1999.24 However, not all of this capital was new, for some of it
surely came from other locations. For example, it is estimated that, as a
consequence of Congress repealing the portfolio interest withholding tax,
the U.S. lured approximately $300 billion away from the Latin American
2
countries. 1
Thus, not surprisingly, one country after the next responded in
kind, introducing measures that not only discouraged the outbound migration of their country's capital, but also encouraged the importation of
large amounts of capital from higher-taxing jurisdictions.2 6 Some countries
created tax-exempt domestic investment opportunities; some relaxed their
enforcement efforts; but most followed the U.S.'s lead, exempting their
withholding tax on imported interest income and substantially cutting
27
their corporate and individual tax rates.

increase in foreign portfolio investment in the United States during 1984
through 1988. See Exhibit 2, infra.
23 See Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet First Met, 3 GREEN BAG 171-72 (2000).
24 See Department of Commerce, supra note 22, and Examples 2 and 3, infra,
which are based thereon.
25 See Globalization, supra note 2, at 1585-86.
26 See TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD, supra note 2, at 130-31.
27 By 1993, the following countries no longer taxed interest earned on bank accounts owned by nonresident aliens: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.
See id. at 131. With the exception of Ireland and Investment Funds located in
Luxembourg, all of these countries impose fairly significant taxes on business
profits, but even these rates have been falling over the years. During the 1980s,
most of the world's developed and developing countries had, on average, reduced their top marginal individual and corporate rates from 60 to 40 percent
and from 46 to 35 percent, respectively. See MICHAEL J. BOSKIN & CHARLES E.
McLuRE, JR., WORLD TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 282 (1990). Today, these average rates are even lower. Developed
OECD countries have an average corporate rate of 34.8 percent; comparatively
less developed countries in the Asia Pacific region have an average rate of 31.7
percent; and the even less developed countries in Latin America have an average rate of 28.6 percent. See KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Survey - January 1999,

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol16/iss1/3

10

Weiss: International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenom

2001]

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION

From a U.S. taxpayer's perspective, however, none of these taxfavored foreign investments would seem to matter. After all, the U.S. taxes
all of its citizens on their worldwide income. 28 So even if a U.S. taxpayer is
not physically present in the U.S., and all of his income is from foreign
sources, U.S. tax is nevertheless due? Perhaps. At the outset, it should be
noted that U.S. taxpayers typically do not pay more than their U.S. marginal tax rate on their foreign source income. U.S. taxpayers are not double
taxed because they receive a foreign tax credit (FTC) for income taxes
that are paid (or accrued) to most foreign countries; 29 though this credit
is sensibly capped by the amount of U.S. tax that would have been due
30
had the foreign income been earned in the U.S.
Besides encouraging inbound investments, the U.S. has also encouraged its citizens to directly invest abroad. Congress has long recognized that its residency-based taxing regime places its taxpayers at a competitive disadvantage. This is because the U.S. is the only major economic
3
power that taxes its citizens on their worldwide income.*
A foreign competitor, even if comparatively less efficient, would thus have a decided advantage by merely operating in a tax haven. So to help level the playing
field (or to perpetuate the tax race, depending on how you look at it), a
number of exceptions to the U.S.'s residency-based taxation regime have

(visited April 15, 2000) <http//www.tax.kpmg.net>. Finally, there are of course
an abundance of "no-tax" and very "low tax" possessions primarily in the Caribbean. See generally TAx HAVENS OF THE WORLD, supra note 22.
28 See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (2000).
29 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 901-08 (1994 & Supp. 2000). Section 9010) prohibits an FTC
for foreign taxes that are paid or accrued to certain blacklisted countries. See
Rev. Rul. 95-63, 1995-2 C.B. 85 (blacklisting Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria). This "blacklist," moreover, may soon include certain identified
tax havens. See Part III, infra.
30 See 26 U.S.C. § 904(a) (1994). This FTC limitation is indeed sensible. Without
it, U.S. taxpayers would be largely - although in some situations, not entirely indifferent to how much they paid in foreign taxes because the U.S. government would pay the amount that exceeded the U.S. rate. Since there would be
no market check on the amount that could be charged, foreign governments
would inevitably bilk the U.S. fisc.
31
The Philippines also taxes its citizens on their worldwide income, and beginning January 1, 2001, Venezuela will too. See CHARLES I. KINGSON & CYNTHIA A.
BLUM, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 30 (1998); KPMG, 2 Global Tax News: Venezuela Introduces Worldwide Tax Basis, No. 22 (November 12, 1999) <http://
www.tax.kpmg.net>.
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been created. 32
U.S. corporations often take advantage of foreign tax holidays
through the use of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs). As a general
matter, the U.S. respects a foreign corporation's separate legal identity,
even if U.S. persons own all of its outstanding stock. Consequently, a U.S.
parent is not subject to tax on its foreign subsidiary's business profits until
such foreign income is repatriated, whether the CFC pays foreign tax on
its profits or not. 33Thus, so long as the U.S. parent does not draw on its
CFC's earnings, U.S. tax is generally not due. 4 Yet even when the CFC's
earnings are repatriated, studies indicate that even these distributions
largely escape U.S. tax. For example, one study of roughly 18,000 CFCs
found that "[m]ost CFCs appear to generate no U.S. tax liability on their

In addition to the CFC and export provisions discussed below, there are a
number of other exceptions to the U.S.'s worldwide taxing regime. For example, U.S. citizens and resident aliens may exclude up to the following amounts
of foreign earned income: $76,000 in 2000; $78,000 in 2001; and $80,000 in 2002
and beyond, which will be adjusted for inflation beginning January 1, 2008. See
26 U.S.C. § 911(b)(2)(D) (1994). Moreover, U.S. corporations that at least partially operate in the U.S. possessions were practically exempt from all taxation.
See 26 U.S.C. § 936 (Supp. 1996); Raymond Wacker & Mitchell Weiss, Restrictions
to the Section 936 Credit Imposed by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, 20 INT'L
TAX J. 24 (1994). While Congress repealed this "tax sparing" provision in 1996,
much of it remains available for so called "existing credit claimants." See 26
U.S.C. § 936 (Supp. 2000); Raymond Wacker & Julie Sobery, United States Finally
Ends the Puerto Rico and Possession Credit of Code Section 936 - A Decade From Now,
23 INT'L TAxJ. 62 (1997).
33See 26 U.S.C. §§ 951-60 (1994). There are a number of exceptions to this general rule. For example, the Secretary has the authority under Section 482 to
"distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among" the parent and foreign subsidiary in order to approximate what would have been reported had there been an arms-length transaction. Additionally, Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code subjects the U.S.
parent to current taxation on certain forms of income that are earned but not
distributed by the parent's foreign subsidiary. See 26 U.S.C. § 951(a); Part III,
infra.
14 However, even if the foreign profits are repatriated, deferring the tax is the
equivalent of receiving an exemption on the income that is earned on the tax
that is deferred. See generally Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261-75
(1977), reprinted in RICHARD A POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAw AND SECURITIES REGULATION 257 (1980) ("[R] emember that by
conventional folk wisdom, 10 years of tax deferral is almost as good as
exemption.").
32
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income each year. 35
The recent international dispute regarding the U.S.'s foreign sales
corporation (FSC) provisions also nicely illustrates today's competitive international tax race. European exporters are not normally subject to their
countries' value-added tax. The U.S. believed that this situation placed
U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage; and so in 1984 Congress enacted the FSC provisions, which provided various tax breaks to certain
qualifying U.S. exporters. 36 The European Union responded by filing a
complaint with the World Trade Organization's Settlement Body (Settlement Body). On March 20, 2000, the Settlement Body formally held that
the U.S.'s FSC provisions constitute an illegal export subsidy and thus violate the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 7 Consequently, the U.S. had until November 1, 2000 to repeal its FSC provisions
or face punitive, retaliatory trade sanctions from the European Union.
The U.S. chose the former route. 38 But rather than eliminating the malignant provision, the U.S. decided to extend it.39 The new legislation, which
generally applies to all transactions occurring on or after September 30,
2000, provides a broad exclusion for all "qualifying foreign trade income,"
whether the goods that give rise to such income are manufactured in or
outside of the U.S., and whether the taxpayer is an individual or a corporation.40 The European Union is now challenging this new legislation, arguing that it too constitutes an illegal export subsidy.4' And so the compe-

35

James R. Hines, Jr. & R. Glenn Hubbard, Coming Home to America: Dividend Re-

patriationsBy U.S. Multinationals, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 174 (Assaf

Razin and Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
36 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 921-927 (1999).
37 See WTO Appellate Body Report Rejecting U.S. Appeal on FSC Tax Incentives, 2000 TNT 38-12 (Feb. 25, 2000).
38 See Robert Goulder, U.S. Will Comply With WTO Ruling on FSC, But Details Re-

main Unclear, 2000 TNT 70-3 (April 10, 2000) (quoting Rita Hayes, the then
U.S.'s Trade Ambassador's, comment that "it is the intention of the United
States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the [Settlement Body]
in a manner that respects our WTO obligations [but that is also] consistent with
our goal of ensuring that U.S. exporters are not placed at a disadvantage in relation to their foreign competitors.").
39 See FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, P.L. 106519.
40 See 26 U.S.C. § 114; Conference Committee Report accompanying the Taxpayer Relief Act of 2000 (H.R. 2614).
41 See Scott Cordia, U.S. Senate Finance Committee Questions Nominee for U.S. Trade
Representative on FSC, Beef and Banana Disputes, 22 TAx NOTES INT'L. 588 (Feb. 5,
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tition continues.
As the foregoing amply demonstrates, the U.S. has openly embraced today's international tax race: it has practically exempted all foreign portfolio investment income from U.S. taxation; and it has created
large gaps in its worldwide taxing regime, thus encouraging U.S. taxpayers
to go global and thereby escape (or at least defer) U.S. tax on their foreign source income. 42 Right or wrong, the U.S. has practically had no
choice in the matter, for if U.S. businesses were subject to U.S. tax on
their worldwide income, new multinationals would find it incredibly disadvantageous to incorporate in the U.S. 43 In other words, if you can't beat
them, at least join them. So this brings us to the critical question: is international tax competition globally inefficient?
B. CapitalExport Neutrality
The answer to this question is by no means simple or clear. From
a global perspective, proponents of the capital export neutrality (CEN)
theory - a theory that is essentially an adaptation of the substitution effect to the world economy - frequently argue that international tax competition is inefficient.44 Under this theory, tax competition distorts investment decisions and thereby undermines the efficient allocation of the
world's resources. A capitalist country's resources are primarily bound up
in its citizens. So if its citizens can earn a greater after-tax return on a for-

2001) (quoting Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's position that "if the Europeans continue to proceed the way they have . . . they're going to have major
trouble.").
42 In fact, the government has recently made it even easier for U.S. corporations
to avoid U.S tax on their foreign source income. In 1996, Congress repealed
Section 956A, which complemented Subpart F's anti-deferral rules by imposing a
current tax on the foreign corporation's excess passive assets. See Small Business
job Protection Act of 1996, § 1501 (a) (2). And in 1997, the Treasury promulgated its "check the box" regulations, which essentially provide U.S. corporations with the option of deferring U.S. tax on their foreign source business income, even if the foreign affiliate is not characterized as a corporation under
the foreign country's laws. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 et seq. (2000).
43 Publicly traded U.S. corporations can no longer avoid Subchapter F by merely
reincorporating outside the U.S. See 26 U.S.C. § 1248(i) (1994); I.R.S. Notice 9446, 1994-1 C.B. 356.
44 See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies,
47 J.FTIN. 1159 (1992); Michael P. Devereux & Mark Pearson, European Tax Harmonization and Production Efficiency, 39 EUR. ECON. REV. 1657, 1660 (1995); Globalization, supra note 2.
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eign investment, but a greater pre-tax return on a domestic investment,
the tax differential between these two countries may induce an inefficient
allocation of the home country's resources. An example best illustrates
this point.
Example 2. A taxpayer has a choice. He can earn a $100 pre-tax return in Country A, his home country, or a $90 pre-tax return on the same
amount invested in Country B, a foreign country. Both Countries, A and
B, impose a flat 20 percent tax on only the income their respective citizens
earn in their respective countries; otherwise, no tax is due. Accordingly,
the taxpayer will owe Country A $20 if he invests in Country A, but no
taxes - to either Country A or B - if he invests in Country B. This latter
result occurs because Country B only taxes the income its citizens earn in
Country B. While the taxpayer would earn income in Country B, he is a
citizen of Country A, not B. Likewise, if the taxpayer invests in Country B,
he will not owe tax in Country A because Country A also only taxes its citizens on the income they earn in Country A. So the taxpayer's choice is.
obvious: he will invest in Country B, where he will receive $10 more on
the same amount invested. That is, he will receive $90 in Country B ($90
pre-tax income minus $0 in taxes) but only $80 if he invested in Country
A ($100 pre-tax income minus $20 of Country A's taxes) .41
Many tax scholars would argue that this example demonstrates the
inefficiencies international tax competition creates. 46 In an effort to attract
each other's capital, neither country, A nor B, has imposed any tax on any
income the other country's citizens earn. Capital Export Neutrality is thus
violated because the taxpayer's investment decision was (at least partially)
based on the different tax treatment each country accords the other coun-

It should be noted that this taxing regime will not always produce an inefficient result. For example, assume that Country A offered two investment opportunities, Al and A2, each of which outperformed I, Country B's investment
opportunity, by $15 and $10, respectively. If the world's supply of capital is fixed,
and could only accommodate two of these three investments, the discriminatory
tax treatment noted above will distort the world's supply of capital, but only if at
least one of these two investments is financed by Country A. In that case, the
pre-tax return differential between investing in Al and B1 is more than offset by
the difference in tax Country A imposes on its citizens as opposed to Country
B's citizens. If, on the other hand, Country B finances both of Country A's investment opportunities, no allocative distortion will obtain.
41

See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on Peroni, Fleming and Shay, "Getting Serious About CurtailingDeferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income," 52 SMU L. REv.

46

531, 534 (1999) ("[Als a pure issue of global efficiency, the current state of the
evidence favors CEN").
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try's imported capital. Hence, to ameliorate this perceived inefficiency,
CEN would require that Country A not distinguish between its citizens'
domestic and foreign sourced income - that, in other words, Country A
tax its citizens on their worldwide income. In that event, the taxpayer
would base his investment decision on a pre-tax basis, and Country A, the
seemingly more efficient of the two, would prevail.
Whether this approach in fact produces an efficient allocation of
the world's resources, however, is far from clear. Sure, by competing with
one another, Country A's resources are being funneled into Country B,
the seemingly less productive of the two. But is Country B really less efficient than Country A? Here again, reality is more complicated than this
example may suggest. The available pre-tax return is $10 more in Country
A than it is in Country B; and this additional $10 will cost the taxpayer
$20. That much is clear. But to determine whether this situation is actually
inefficient requires a closer look at each country's income tax system.
Country A may only be more efficient than Country B in a firstbest world - i.e., in a world in which Country A's tax system does not create other offsetting or exacerbating economic distortions. 47 If Country's
A's $20 tax only produces $9 in total benefits, then investing in Country B
is the more efficient result. In this case, the total net benefits available in
Country A are only $89 ($100 pre-tax return, minus the $20 in tax, plus
the $9 of benefits the tax creates), but the total net benefits available in
Country B are $90. This possibility is not unlikely. Governments are repeatedly wasting their taxpayers' money, so to speak, by re-channeling it
into unproductive or outright wasteful uses. The $20, for instance, may be
paid out in the form of a negative income tax, such as the earned income
credit, 48 which, depending on how much the recipient could otherwise
have earned, may create a work disincentive. 49 If this disincentive materializes, and the welfare recipient foregoes an opportunity that would have
provided society with at least an $11 net gain, then Country B - not
Country A - is the more efficient of the two.
That the U.S. tax law is mired in inefficiencies is hardly controver-

47

See Jarmes R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential Reconsideration, 52

NAT'i, TAX J. 385-404 (1999) (concluding that the distortions created by the corporate level tax may justify the deferral of business income earned by United
States-controlled foreign corporations); Robert A. Green, The Future of SourceBased Taxation of the Income of MultinationalEnterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 18, 34

(1993).
48

49

See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (1994).
See ECONOMIc ANAI.m1IS OF

LAw,

supra note 8, at 511-12.
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sial. 50 While Professor Avi-Yonah does not deny this, he has argued that
this analysis confounds the real issue at hand, namely, whether CEN creates a globally inefficient result.5 ' A broken tax system, in other words,
should not be fixed by meddling in an area that is not related to the part
that needs to be fixed.
This would be convincing if only it were true. A tax system's redistributional function is inextricably tied to its revenue raising function.
Taxation is primarily about the redistribution of wealth - from the pri-vate sector or the middle and upper class to the government or the lower
class, respectively. And there are essentially two ways this can be accomplished: The government can collect and redistribute the revenue; or it
can skip this last step and simply encourage the private sector to directly
2
redistribute its own wealth.
In fact, the U.S. income tax system uses both of these approaches.
By only taxing a taxpayer's net income, the government not only collects
revenue; it is also subsidizes many of those activities for which a deduction
is permitted. A deductible expense, after all, only costs the taxpayer one
minus the taxpayer's marginal rate times the cost incurred. So if the deductibility of a particular cost creates a substitution effect in either kind
or degree, it is economically no different than if the government disallowed the deduction, collected the additional tax, and then at least partially redistributed it to the affected recipient.5 3 This notion of an implicit

For example, the American Law Institute has insistently called for the elimination of the net operating loss limitations. See, e.g., ALI Fed. Income Tax Project, Tentative Draft No. 5, 20 (April 28, 1980) ("[A] n inducement might be created to carry on the business even if there were no hope whatever of profitable
operation, just in order to preserve the benefit of the loss carryover against
other profits."); ALI Fed. Income Tax Project, Mem. No. 7, 262-63 (June 7,
1976) ("[T]he requirement seems often to create an inducement to uneconomic behavior . . .Nothing significant can be said in favor of this result); AL
Fed. Income Tax Project, Mem. No. 2, 87 (October 30, 1974) (same).
51 See Globalization, supra note 2, at 1604-05.
52 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 1391-96 (Supp. 1996) (providing employers with a credit
for wages paid to certain employees who lived and worked in designated poverty-stricken areas).
13 Whether this tax subsidy is only partially redistributed depends on-the incidence of the tax - that is, which party would have ultimately bore the burden,
had it not been subsidized. There is yet no consensus on this issue, only debate.
For a sampling of the classic debates, see R.A. Musgrave et al., Distributionof Tax
Payments by Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948, NAT TAx JouRNAL, 1-53 (March
1951); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN & BENJAMIN A- OKNER, WHO BEARs THE TAX BURDEN?
50
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redistribution creates a significant exception to the CEN model.
While some governments, such as the U.S., decide who receives
these implicit redistributions, others do not. In fact, some governments
may encourage implicit redistributions by simply exempting all or some
forms of income from taxation, leaving it up to the private sector to work
out the exact terms of the country's social compact. Not who decides but
how much has been redistributed is what is important.
Returning to Example 2, an implicit transfer payment may already
be impounded in Country B's $90 pre-tax return. It is important to remember that this $90 pre-tax return is already net of all costs except the
tax. Thus, earning this $90 may, for example, require that the taxpayer
educate Country B's workforce, improve its infrastructure, or undertake a
whole host of other activities Country B's government could have performed itself. If this is the case, as it almost always is to some extent, comparing pre-tax returns is plainly amiss. Country A may use the $20 it
would receive in taxes to improve its infrastructure, whereas Country B,
for whatever reason, may have exempted its income from taxation, knowing that the $90 pre-tax return necessitates a similar $20 infrastructure investment. In that event, Country B would again be more efficient: on a
pre-tax, pre-redistributional basis, Country B would produce a $110 return
($90 pre-tax return, plus the $20 infrastructure investment incurred),
whereas Country A would only produce its $100 return on the same
amount invested.
Perhaps this analysis is objectionable in that it conflates the two
cornerstones of any income tax system, namely, the principals of efficiency
and equity.5 4 Equity or fairness, it might be argued, justifies the redistribution of wealth, and that is what happens when the government either collects and redistributes its tax revenue or provides a substitution inducing
tax preference, not when the government merely exempts some income
and then allows the market forces to decide who gets what. In the latter
case, there is no redistribution, only the market forces are at work. But in

(Brookings Instit. 1974); JOSEPH J. MINARIK, WHO DOESN'T BEAR THE TAX BURDEN,
HENRY J. AARON & MICHAEL J. BoSKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION,
55-68 (Brookings Instit. 1980).
54 See GEORGE F. BREAK & JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 4-10 (1975). Some commentators posit a third aim: simplicity. However, few can seriously contend that this objective has been (or in today's sophisticated world can be) accomplished without gravely jeopardizing both horizontal
and vertical notions of equity. Moreover, simplicity is more properly characterized as a subset of efficiency, for the simpler a tax system is, the cheaper it is to
administer, and thus the smaller its dead weight loss.
reprinted in
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the end, are these two principles, efficiency and equity, all that distinct
from one another? 55
The first category is about increasing the size of the "pie" - calibrating the economy in a way that makes at least someone better off
while, at the same time, leaving everyone else no worse off (often-called a
Pareto-superior move).56 This very rarely happens, for someone is almost
always made worse off. Nonetheless, if a particular legal rule produces
more gains than losses, a Pareto-superior state would still obtain if the
winners compensated the losers. And it is this efficiency variant (oftencalled Potential Pareto-superior or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency)57 that bridges
the gap between efficiency and equity. A particular tax regime may be efficient but only if some of the gains are redistributed.
Indeed, whether the private or public sector actually administers a
country's redistributional system may merely turn on which one has
achieved economies of scale. In a competitive environment, groups - i.e.,
firms, communities, countries, etc. - are formed in response to economies of scale. It is either necessary5 8 or cheaper for a number of members
to pool together their resources, and so groups are formed. 59 Thus,
whether the government or a multinational firm should redistribute the
country's wealth should necessarily depend on which one can do it more
efficiently; that is, which one has achieved (but not exceeded) economies

Under a postmodernist/antifoundationalist approach, Professor Crawford believes they are not. See Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REv. 501, 534 (1997) ("The efficiency/
equity dichotomy may be a less useful analytic scheme for approaching tax policy issues than is currently acknowledged."); see also Daniel J. Frisch, Comment
55

on Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing InternationalIncome: An Analysis of
the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, reprinted in ASSAF RAZIN AND JOEL
that equity
SLEMROD, TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 50 (1990) ("I agree ...
is basically irrelevant to international tax policy.").
56 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 182 (rev. ed.

1990).
57 See id. at 186-87.

It is necessary whenever the benefits of a public good or service cannot be
adequately metered out in proportion to the amounts contributed to finance it.
Because everyone would have an incentive to free-ride off of each other, if these
goods or services were not centrally administered, a sub-optimum level of public
goods or services would inevitably be provided. See EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,
supra note 8, at 523.
59 See PATRICIA Apps, A THEORY OF INEQUALITY AND TAXATION 43-44 (1981).
58
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of scale. 60 Answering this question, however, is difficult, if not impossible,
because the size of each country varies and the presence of multinationals
come and go.
Yet what is clear is that there exists little justification for a country
to tax income that is earned on imported portfolio capital. So long as the
foreign investor remains outside the host country, and its tax benefits do
not spill over into the taxpayer's country, the taxpayer obviously cannot
benefit from the host country's public expenditures, however they are administered. 6 1 Indeed, this may explain (or at least justify) why the U.S., for
the most part, does not tax foreign portfolio investment income.
C. CapitalImport Neutrality

This Article has thus far only considered the. efficiency effect international tax competition may have on the demand for a particular country's resources. The bottom line is mixed. On the one hand, residencybased taxation eliminates the effect cross-border tax differentials may have
on a taxpayer's decision where to invest; but on the other hand, there are
a number of reasons why this approach may produce economically inefficient results. What's more, CEN completely ignores the effect international tax competition may have on the world's supply of investment capital. Indeed, it just assumes that the world's supply of capital is fixed,
unresponsive to available returns. 62 This cannot be true, as a number of
63
supply-side economic studies indicate.

60At

some point beyond this optimum size, it becomes increasingly more costly
for the group to coordinate its efforts. See R H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 4 (1937), reprinted in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND
THE LAW 43 (1988). The United States, at least in some respects, has quite
clearly exceeded this point. See, e.g., The Turn Against Taxes, THE ECONOMIST: THE
WORLD IN 2000, Dec. 31, 1999, at 106 [hereinafter "Turn Against Taxes"] (con-

cluding that because "governments spend their money less carefully and less efficiently than [the private sector], [f]ully funded personal pension plans, based
on an individual's savings, are sweeping away the poorly funded public pensions
promised by governments."); The Fans of Mars, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2000 at
85-86 (concluding that because the private sector is "better organised, more
adaptable, .

.

. and ma[kes] better use of the latest technologies," the first

manned mission to Mars will probably be privately financed).
61 See TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD, supra note 2, at 69.
62

See

COME
63

See

PEGGY

G. MUSGRAVE,

UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN-

30 (1969).
VED

COUNTIES

P.

GANDHI,

SUPPLY-SIDE TAX POLICY:

ITS RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING

188 (1987) (concluding that the "data are consistent with the exis-
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Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) accommodates these concerns by
treating foreign and domestic taxpayers alike. Since a country can only tax
its own citizens on their worldwide income, this approach boils down to a
source-based method of taxation: regardless of where the taxpayer resides,
each country will only tax the income that is earned within its borders.
Capital Import Neutrality is thus appealing because it optimizes the supply, though not necessarily the allocation, of the world's resources.
The cost of a firm's capital is largely dependent on its perform64
ance. So the more profitable a firm is, the cheaper it should be to finance. At least relative to CEN, CIN furthers this fundamental financial
theory. In a CIN world, for any given investment opportunity, the after-tax
return would be the same for all competing investors, wherever they happen to reside. Thus by treating all investors alike, CIN eliminates what
CEN at times creates: external barriers to investing in a particular country. 65 Even if the world's supply of capital is relatively inelastic, the most
promising ventures will attract the most financing opportunities; and the
fiercer the competition is to finance a particular venture, all else equal,
the cheaper the venture's cost of capital should be.
Returning to Example 2, in addition to violating CEN, since both
countries, A and B, discriminate in favor of the other country's citizens,
CIN is also violated. Country A's taxpayers are not subject to Country B's
tax, and vice versa. It is quite possible that Country A is the more efficient
of the two - its pre-tax return, after all, is $10 more than Country B's.
But by only taxing its citizens, Country A may have systematically increased its taxpayers' cost of capital. As discussed in Part II(B), the taxpayer will not invest in Country A because, even though Country A's pretax return is $10 more than Country B, he will receive $10 more if he invests in Country B. Therefore, in order to attract its taxpayers' capital, the
pre-tax return in Country A will have to exceed $112.50 ($90 after tax re-

tence of a Laffer curve in Jamaica").
6 See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958), reprinted in RICHAR) A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 237-45 (1980); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 176 (1991) (stating that a firm's capital
structure "matters only when it affects some other variable, such as taxes, or the
probability of bankruptcy (with attendant costs of restructuring or fighting over
spoils), or when it changes the incentives of investors to monitor the
managers").
65 Of course internal barriers, such as excessively high taxes, may still distort a
particular firm's ability to raise capital.
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turn in Country B divided by 80 percent - one minus Country A's tax
rate). In other words, by discriminating against its own taxpayers, and
thereby limiting the competition over the supply of its capital, Country A
has made it more costly for its taxpayers to finance Country A's operations. But whether this discriminatory treatment increases Country A's cost
of capital depends on which country, A or B, finances Country A's investment opportunities. For the reasons just stated, if the capital comes from
within, Country A's taxing regime will (relative to a tax-free environment)
increase its taxpayer's cost of capital. But by encouraging inbound investment, Country A's taxing regime may actually decrease Country A's cost of
capital.
Example 3. Assume taxpayers in Country A and B are considering
where to invest. At an intuitive level, it may appear that this hypothetical
makes it. more costly for Country A to finance the venture. Each taxpayer
will invest in the other country, and thus competition over the price
charged for these two investments will be limited. Yet as it turns out, limiting competition in this way decreases Country A's cost of capital.
Because each country only taxes its own citizens on their domestic
source income, Country B's taxpayers will always outbid Country A's taxpayers. The former will agree to finance Country A's investment as long as
its pre-tax return exceeds $72, their opportunity cost of investing in Country B, whereas Country A's taxpayers will never go lower than $112.50,
their grossed-up opportunity cost of investing in Country B. If, however,
both countries taxed all of their domestic source income at a flat 20 percent rate, Country A's cost of capital will actually increase. This is because
both taxpayers would forego the same after-tax opportunity cost of investing in Country B. There, they would both receive $72 after tax, and would
66
thus insist on nothing less than a $90 pre-tax return in Country A.
Example 4. Although, as the preceding example illustrates, CIN
may increase a country's cost of capital, it may also expand the aggregate
supply base. Assuming Country A is the more efficient of the two, if the
facts in Example 2 are flipped, no allocative distortion would result. If a
citizen of Country B had to decide between investing in Country A or B,
he would surely choose A. There, he would earn $100 both before and after tax ($100 pre-tax minus $0 taxes), whereas in Country B he would

66 See Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, Integration of International Capital Markets: The
Size of Government and Tax Coordination, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,

supra note 51, at 33148 (finding that the liberalization of the capital markets
reduces the cost of public funds, and thus increases the optimal level of public
goods and services).
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only earn $90 before tax and $72 after tax ($90 pre-tax minus 20 percent).
In this scenario, the tax competition does not distort the efficient allocation of the world's resources - it encourages it!
Whether CIN increases the world's supply of capital, however, deon
how responsive such supply is to a change in the world's afterpends
tax returns. 6 7 Capital Export Neutrality frustrates this "supplementary" effect. A taxpayer may be willing to postpone more of his current consumption if he can earn an after-tax return of, say, ten percent. A tax haven
may exactly satisfy this investment objective, but if the taxpayer is taxed on
his worldwide income, he will not achieve his investment goal, and he will
thus forgo this additional savings opportunity. Yet CIN is no panacea. If all
countries adopt a non-discriminatory source-based system of taxation, but
their tax rates vary, CIN will reshuffle the attractiveness of the world's investment opportunities, so that those which offer the highest after-tax returns will be the most attractive, even if, on a pre-tax basis, they happen
to be the least attractive. Capital Export Neutrality, at least in a first-best
world, prevents this from happening.
In short, both CEN and CIN have their difficulties. If all countries
taxed their citizens on their worldwide income, their citizens would be unaffected by tax holidays and other enticements unrelated to the investment's market potential. However, such an approach may stifle savings, assumes a first-best world, and ignores the possibility that a country's
transfer payments may already be impounded in its available pre-tax returns. Since CIN looks to the after-tax bottom line, it avoids all of these
difficulties, though at the cost of a new one. If the world's tax rates vary,
as they nearly always do, source based taxation may funnel capital into
68
comparatively less productive ventures, simply on account of a tax break.

67

See

MUSGRAVE,

supra note 62, at 32 ("Foreign investment, at least to some de-

gree, will be an addition to, rather than a substitute for, domestic investment.").

Additionally, source-based taxation is getting increasingly more difficult to administer. See, e.g., Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 12 at § 7.1.5 ("In the world of cyberspace, it is often difficult,
if not impossible, to apply traditional source concepts to link an item of income
with a specific geographical location. Therefore, source based taxation could
lose its rationale and be rendered obsolete by electronic commerce."). This is a
problem onto itself, and one that has already received much commentary. See,
68

10.01
e.g., DAVID E. HARDESTY, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: TAXATION AND PLANNING
- 13.05 (1999); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic
Objectives, Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269 (1997);
Adrian J. Sawyer, Electronic Commerce: InternationalPolicy Implications for Revenue
Authorities and Governments, 19 VA. TAx. REV. 73 (1999);.Arthur J. Cockfield, Bal-
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Of course it would be ideal if the world could somehow adopt only the
best of these two approaches, but that would require a worldwide uniform
69
rate of taxation - a feat that has heretofore never been accomplished.
IV.

THE

WORLD'S

RESPONSE

A. The Tax Base Erosion

Globalization has undoubtedly intensified international tax competition; and as is so often the case, those who are on the losing side often
try, futilely, to impede its progress. The OECD is no exception. On April
9, 1998, the OECD approved a report, entitled "Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue" (OECD REPORT).70 This report, as its title
gives away, is the OECD's latest attempt to root out "harmful tax havens"
and "preferential tax regimes" that are eroding the member states' tax bases and are thus "reduc[ing] the tax that would otherwise be payable to
them. "71

Before turning to the substance of this report, it should be noted
that the existing data does not conclusively corroborate the OECD's concerns.7 2 In fact, the OECD concedes as much. 73 Yet the data that is available is in accord. Substantial amounts of capital are increasingly being
channeled into tax havens. The OECD Report, for example, indicates that
in 1994 the G7 countries invested over $200 billion in various Caribbean

ancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Business Profits, 74
TUL. L. Riv. 133 (1999).
69 See Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 94 Q.J. or ECON. 793, 795 (1980).
70

See

ORGANISATION

FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL

TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE

(1998)

[hereinafter "OECD

REPORT"].

71 Id.

at 37.

See Globalization, supra note 2, at 1597 ("[T]here is no evidence that overall
revenue from the personal or corporate income tax in OECD member countries
has declined either as a percent of GDP or of total tax revenue from 1965 to
1995."); A Survey of Globalisation and Tax, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 17
[hereinafter "Globalisation and Tax"] ("[I]n most developed countries tax revenues as a proportion of GDP have in fact risen over the past 30 years, and the
share of' taxes on corporate profits in overall tax revenues has remained much
the same.") (emphasis added).
73 See OECD REPORT, supra note 70, at 17 ("The available data do not permit a
detailed comparative analysis of the economic and revenue effects involving lowtax jurisdictions.").
72
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and South Pacific islands - a more than 500. percent increase over the
aggregate amount invested in 1985.1 4 Moreover, while traditional tax
havens only account for 1.2 percent of the world's population, and only
three percent of the world's GDP, they account for 26 percent of U.S.
multinationals' assets and 31 percent of their net profits. 75 That the international tax base is eroding thus seems clear, lest there would be little
need to invest such large amounts in these small islands.
B. The OECD's Suggested Solution
The OECD Report is the developed countries' latest response to
their depleting revenue bases. This report, which binds no one, is broken
out into three chapters. Chapter One gives a brief overview of the purported deleterious effects globalization is having on the member states'
tax bases. Chapter Two attempts to distinguish between those tax practices
that are deemed "harmful" and those that are not. And Chapter Three
sets forth 19 guidelines the 27 member states 76 have agreed to respect;
and it creates a body (the "Forum on Harmful Tax Practices") to review
the member states' tax practices and to encourage non-member states to
"associate themselves with" these guidelines. 77

See id.
7' See Globalisation and Tax, supra note 72, at 17.
76 There are actually 29 member states, but Luxembourg and Switzerland abstained. They could have vetoed the agreement, in which case the remaining
member countries' ability to vote on the OECD's recommendations would fall.
See OECD Report, supra note 70, at 78.
77 Id. at 57. Significantly, the OECD Report only covers geographically mobile
activities, such as financial and other service activities; it does not deal with
those interest-bearing obligations that currently anonymously float tax-free
throughout the world. Since most of the world's governments do not tax foreign
portfolio interest income, see Part II(A), supra, but (from a fiscal budgetary perspective) would like to, the OECD's inability to deal with this "problem" is not
surprising. It at least superficially resembles a stag hunt game: each country will
be better off if it re-introduces its withholding tax, but it will be worse off if not
all of the remaining countries do the same. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 35-36 (1994). But this game is actually embedded
in a larger, more dynamic game. See id. at 191-202. The world fisc may be better
off but will the world market? Restricting the free flow of the world's capital is
hardly a potentially Pareto superior move, for it will increase the world's cost of
capital; it will induce costly shifts to non-member states; and, if the tax rates
vary, it will distort the efficient allocation of the world's capital.
74
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Of central focus is the OECD's request that member states "consider" adopting CFC and foreign investment fund (FIF) regimes "in a
78
fashion consistent with the desirability of curbing harmful tax practices.
The CFC regime taxes the domestic shareholder(s) on certain types or
sources of income that are earned by its controlled foreign corporation.
In some countries (e.g., the U.S. and Germany), this deemed dividend
only applies to certain forms of passive income, regardless of where such
income is earned. But in other countries (e.g., Japan, France and, the
UK), the parent corporation is currently taxed on its foreign corporation's
income if the latter is primarily engaged in a particular type of business,
regardless of what types of income such businesses earn. 79 Drawing on the
U.S.'s passive foreign investment company (PFIC) provisions,80 the FIF
proposal either taxes individual shareholders on their proportionate share
of the FIF's passive income or charges them interest in an amount that
approximates their proportionate share of the FIF's current income.
The OECD's attempt to curb tax competition is obviously weak
and doomed to fail. A basic, obvious flaw that runs throughout the OECD
Report is its waffling definition of "harmful tax competition," an umbrella
term that apparently includes "harmful tax practices" and "tax preference
schemes." While the OECD has acknowledged that low or no income
taxes "can never ...

constitute harmful tax competition," and that other

factors are necessary, it nevertheless fails to enunciate what factors definitively tip the scale or what relative weights should be attached to these varying factors. After enumerating a number of factors, such as refusing to
exchange information, separating foreign from domestic investors, and insubstantial activities, the OECD Report is then peppered with qualifiers:
8
"the concept of 'tax haven' does not have a precise technical meaning"; '
"it may be difficult to gather the information necessary to answer these
83
questions"; 2 and "a subjective evaluation" is necessary.
Chapter One is equally unavailing. There, the closest the OECD
Report comes to defining this term is found on pages eight and 14:

OECD REPORT, supra note 70, at Appendix 67, recommendations 1 and 2. The
member states that have not yet enacted these provisions are indeed taking the
78

OECD's recommendations seriously. See Stefano Guiso-Gallisay, Italy Proposes CFC

Legislation, 2000 WTD 31-5 (February 11, 2000).
79 See OECD REPORT, supra note 70, at 20; U.K Inland Revenue Publish Budget Note
on Proposed Budget 2000 CFC Legislation, 2000 WTD 59-31 (March 21, 2000).
80
81
82
83

See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1297-98 (Supp. 2000).
OECD REPORT, supra note 70, at 20.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
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[harmful tax practices] affect the location of financial and
other service activities, erode the tax bases of other countries, distort trade and investment patterns and undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance
of tax systems generally....

[Tax preference schemes cre-

ate] potential distortions in the patterns of trade and investment and reduce global welfare . . . These schemes . .
. may . . . shift[] part of the tax burden from mobile to

relatively immobile factors and from income to consumption . . . and may hamper the application of progressive

tax rates and the achievement of redistributive goals.
The problem, of course, is that there is hardly an income tax system that does not satisfy either of these descriptions, the qualifications
notwithstanding.
Definitional problems aside,8 4 the OECD Report's fatal flaw is that
it is structurally deficient. Besides its non-binding nature, this agreement
only applies to member states. Non-member states, which include most
of the world's "tax havens," as that term is generally (although not concretely) understood, are in no way bound, and will thus, ironically, become the main benefactors of this agreement - an agreement their financial (and sovereign) existence is designed to adversely affect.
If all OECD states enact CFC and FIF provisions, an OECD individual or corporate shareholder may85 be currently taxed on certain
types of income, but only if the FIF or parent corporation is located in
an OECD member state. Thus, the OECD Report will merely induce a
shift away from the OECD member states. An OECD FIF shareholder
can evade, and sometimes avoid,8 6 the imputation of offshore profits by
either interposing a tax haven conduit or by directly investing in a multitiered CFC/FIF affiliated arrangement. Before the member state can de-

See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis - U.S. Budget Business Provisions:A Blacklist
for Havens, 2000 WTD 35-1 (February 11, 2000) ("Tax havens are not like obscenity. OECD waffling notwithstanding, we can readily define them and identify
them.").
85 Even the U.S.'s CFC and PFIC provisions, which provide perhaps the world's
most sophisticated and stringent anti-deferral regime, are nevertheless fertile
ground for tax avoidance. See Part II(A), supra. It is thus unrealistic to suppose
that this recommendation will definitively plug the member states' depleting tax
bases.
86 See TAx HAVENS OF THE WORLD, supra note 22, at 31 (explaining how a U.S.
shareholder of a Bahamian real estate company can avoid imputation of both
active and passive income, even though the latter, along with a Bahamian grantor trust, owns 100 percent of a Bahamian-based PFIC).
84
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termine if its anti-deferral provisions are applicable, it must first have access to the foreign entity's books and records, and that is something virtually every tax haven will not provide. 87 Likewise, a CFC's parent
corporation is not subject to these anti-deferral rules if it is permanently
established in a country that does not recognize this anti-deferral regime. The net effect of all this will be a proliferation of tax haven-based
CFCs, FIFs, and related conduit vehicles; and so it is not surprising that
some tax havens "regard the whole exercise as a welcome bit of free
advertising.

88

Now of course the OECD member states are not helpless. Indeed, they have two potent tools that they can and actually are beginning to use: the carrot and the stick. Since tax havens will not willingly
stop "poaching" their larger neighbors' tax bases, the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs is currently considering buying them off.89 From a
national budgetary perspective, this approach makes ample economic
sense. The incorporation and administrative fees tax havens receive are
but a speck in relation to the mammoth amounts of taxes the OECD
member states are losing every year.90 Moreover, the U.S. may soon use
the stick as well. As part of its 2001 budget proposal, the Clinton Administration recently proposed blacklisting certain identified tax havens. If
enacted, this measure would scale back a taxpayer's otherwise allowable
FTC to the extent its income is attributable to certain identified tax
havens. 91 Thus, the OECD's plan may be effective after all; or will it?
Assuming all non-member states capitulate, what remains is essentially a "world tax organization" (WTO). While each country's allocative
share of the world's tax revenues will vary, the aggregate amount will depend on their collective agreement - a cartel of global dimensions. 92
And like all cartels, this one also "carries the seeds of its own destruc-

87
88
89

See generally id.
Globalisation and Tax, supra note 72, at 18-19.
See OECD Wants to Help Small Economies Satisfy InternationalAnti-Tax-Haven Stan-

dards, 2000 WTD 47-24 (March 9, 2000); Globalisation and Tax, supra note 72, at

19 (reporting one OECD official's opinion that "i]t would make sense for the
bigger countries to buy them off").
90 Compare TAx HAVENS OF THE WORLD, supra note 22, at 78, 126, 158 (reporting
annual fees of no more than $6,000) with Globalization, supra note 2, at 1600 (es-

timating that in 1997 the United States alone lost $2.2 billion in corporate income taxes).
"' See-g-Rbert Goulder, U.S. Budget Would Blacklist Tax Havens, 2000 WTD 27-.

(February 9, 2000).
See Arthur W. Wright, Review: OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report Falls Short,
98 TNI 158-11 (August 17, 1998).
92
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Stion." 93 Cartels are rife with creation and enforcement problems. The
more members in a cartel, and the more complex its collusive agreement is, the more costly it becomes to communicate and police its strictures. Given the world's wildly varying income tax systems, this obstacle
alone makes a WTO's existence inherently unstable.
But there is more. International competition is obviously not limited to tax incentives; countries compete with one another on numerous
other fronts. So if the worldwide pool of tax revenues is fixed, each
member will naturally try to engross its share by providing its "customers" with other non-tax incentives. 94 The existing international tax competition, in other words, will simply take on a new character. Tariffs,
quantitative import controls, technical regulations, minimum environmental and safety standards, certification systems, and a whole host of
other trade obstacles will inevitably come into play.95 Thus at the end of
the day, the result will be substantially the same: the cartel's tax base
may remain partially intact, but its offsetting costs will be spread out
through all sectors of society.
Professor McIntyre has argued against this characterization. He
claims that the OECD agreement is not a cartel because, unlike a "classic cartel," the OECD members will not reduce their output. In fact,
their output may actually increase. Once the tax race is called off, the
member states will have much more revenue to work with, and so the aggregate amount of public goods and transfer payments will rise, not
fall. 96

This reasoning is unsound. Now it is true that each member's
"output" might rise, but it hardly follows that this cartel variant will not
be just as unstable. The underlying goal of any cartel (or monopolist) is
the extraction of a transfer payment. By reducing its output, and thereby
increasing its price, a cartel increases its profits, so long as its new profit
margin multiplied by its new (smaller) sales quantity exceeds its old
profit margin multiplied by its old (larger) sales quantity. While the
members of a WTO will not reduce their output, they don't have to because they are monopolists in the purest sense of the term. Rather than
manipulate supply and demand, they need only activate their powers of
coercion to extract this transfer payment; and as long as there is nowhere their "customers" can hide, the outcome is just the same.

93 RICHARD

94 See id.

A.

POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

28 (1976).

at 52-53.

95 See generally Jonathan Coppel & Martine Durand, Trends in Market Openness: Ec-

onomics Department Working Papers No. 221 (OECD ECO/WKP(99) 13) (August 12,
1999).
96 See Michael J. McIntyre, McIntyre Finds Fault with Wright's Analogy, 98 TNI 23911 (December 14, 1998).
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C. The Inevitable "Solution"

International tax competition is not unlike other forms of competition. Governments offer various goods and services; and their citizens
and/or their dollars are free to choose that location that best satisfies
their needs. This does not necessarily mean a race to the bottom. It just
means the taxes charged must be worth the public goods and services that
are received. Viewed from this angle, tax competition is desirable. It disci97
plines governments.
Of course there are a number of complicating factors with this
analysis, the most important of which turns on the disproportionate impact tax competition has on different classes of taxpayers. Mobile taxpayers, it might be argued, are free-riding on less mobile taxpayers, receiving
the benefits provided by high-tax jurisdictions while paying low or no
taxes. This is only partially true. Since high-bracket taxpayers earn a disproportionate amount of the world's capital income, shifting it to low-tax
jurisdictions merely reduces the progressivity of the world's tax bases. This
argument thus has very little to do with free-riding, a morally charged,
conclusory term, and very much to do with progressivity. Indeed, if the tax
law took free-riding seriously, progressivity would be nonexistent.
A further difficulty with this argument is that it assumes the magnitude of the benefits one receives from a tax system increases as one's income increases and then, at some point, increases even more rapidly. This
is obviously not the case. Even the costs of providing the purest forms of
public goods, i.e., administering the government, national/local defense,
98
public parks, etc., do not vary with the level of the taxpayer's income.
But taxation is not just about efficiency; it is also about the inextricably related goal of redistributing society's wealth. If by reducing its
taxes, a country can no longer finance its social safety net, its citizens will
not put up with this for long. Soaking the rich is always a distinct possibility whenever a government is based on majority rule. 99 But in order to do

97See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,

422 (1956).
98 See WALTER

J.

BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE

35-37 (1953).
99See id. at 19 ("Under any progressive system today the higher surtax rates are
almost certain to apply only to a minority of voters. This means that a majority
are allowed to set the rates which fall exclusively on the minority."). As it turns
out, this has already occurred. See Age of FiscalSocialism, THE ECONoMIST, Apr. 15,
the wealthiest 1% of tax2000, at 30 ("Twenty years ago, America's super-rich
payers - paid 19% of all federal taxes. Now they pay a third. The share paid by
TAXATION

-
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that, the focus of the world's taxing systems will unavoidably have to shift
to less mobile bases, such consumption, labor, and particularly land. Although these tax bases minimize the various distortions discussed above,
they also greatly complicate the redistribution of society's wealth.
It is this de-emphasis on redistribution that concerns Professor AviYonah. He has argued that the world's shrinking tax base, coupled with
the world's aging population, has placed the world's public pension programs in grave danger. But rather than accept the inevitable, a shift to privately funded pensions, 100 Professor Avi-Yonah supports the status quo,
since he believes the alternative is even worse: " [G]lobalization results...
in increased job insecurity, income volatility, and income disparities that
exacerbate rather than reduce the need for government-provided social
insurance." 10 This dire prediction, however, is a quantum jump from what
has actually happened thus far.
Foreign firms consistently out-pay and out-employ their domestic
counterparts. In the U.S., for example, foreign firms paid their employees
4 percent more than the national average in 1989 and 6 percent more in
1996.102 Foreign firms also create more jobs than their domestic counterparts. From 1989 to 1996, the U.S. workforce employed by foreign firms
increased 1.4 percent per year, while over this same time period, the U.S.
domestic workforce only increased .8 percent per year.103
As for the widening income disparities among the world's richest
and poorest countries, that too is undergoing sea changes. A recent study
by Professor Lucas 0 4 indicates that globalization is having a profoundly
beneficial effect on the redistribution of the world's wealth. Worldwide income inequality has no doubt increased over the past two centuries; but
the same process that created this disparity is now beginning to eliminate
it. As a result of capital migration, and informational and technological

the merely wealthy - the top 5% - has risen from just over a third to just over
half during the same period."). Although labor is much less mobile than capital, at some point, shifting the tax burden toward the -rich will induce "brain
drain" - that is, the country's most talented individuals will emigrate elsewhere,
and thereby take with them the massive positive externalities that their efforts
create. See TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD, supra note 2, at 36-37.
100 Since Chile privatized its pension plan in 1981, numerous other countries
have followed its lead. See Turn Against Taxes, supra note 60, at 106.
1I Globalization, supra note 2, at 1638.
102 See Globalisation:Foreign Friends, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2000, at 71, 74.

See id.
104 See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Some Macroeconomics for the 21st Century, 14 J. ECON.
103

PERsP. 159 (2000).
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spillovers, less developed countries are now growing at a faster rate than
the world's leading economies. 01 5 Thus globalization is not just reducing
the world's income gap, it is eliminating it: "sooner or later everyone will
join the industrial revolution .... all economies will grow at the rate common to the wealthiest economies, and [the] percentage differences in in0
come levels will disappear."

6

International tax competition furthers this desirable process. Taxpayers seek to maximize their after-tax return, potential inefficiencies notwithstanding. But as the low-tax jurisdictions' employees become more efficient, and their countries/islands more accommodating, the pre-tax
return on the amount invested will rise in relation to what that same
amount would earn on a pre-tax basis in the taxpayer's home country. As
a result, the pre-tax returns that are available in both countries will converge, and thus the aforementioned inefficiencies, if any, will diminish.
V. CONCLUSION

The income tax system is a vestige of the past. It is not only based
on the physical world, but it also presupposes a relatively closed economy
in which it operates. Today, capital can traverse the world in a matter of
nanoseconds; information is immediately accessible; and Western capitalistic principles are sweeping throughout most of the formerly centrally
planned economies. A byproduct of this phenomenon has been international tax competition, not necessarily a race to the bottom, but a competitive race nonetheless. This has certainly created some short-term distortions, but how much is anyone's guess.
The OECD is not so much concerned about these inefficiencies as
it is the erosion of its member states' tax bases. As their tax revenues
shrink, as they undoubtedly will, the OECD member states will soon face
political disequilibrium over their inability to finance their welfare states.
Their response to this looming problem was predictable: Rather than
adapting their tax systems to this New World, they are attempting to adapt
this New World to their tax systems. This, however, will require the establishment of a world tax organization, which, absent a single, worldwide political institution, is doomed to fail.
Although there is little that can be done, there is nothing that
should be done about this phenomenon. Developing countries are surely
"begging their neighbors"' tax bases, and they may even be less efficient,
but this is only a temporary shortcoming of globalization. Eventually, the
world's knowledge base, and thus its efficiencies, will converge. In the

105See
106

id. at 160, 164.

Id. at 166.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol16/iss1/3

32

Weiss: International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenom

131

INTERNATIONAL TAx COMPETITION

2001]

meantime, the world's leading economies should begin to adapt their income tax systems to the inevitable rather than attempt to postpone the
unavoidable.
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Exhibit 3
US vs. Foreign Direct Investment
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